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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 20020330-CA

vs.
Priority No. 2

LANCE PETERSON,
Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State appealsfroman order dismissing the charges against defendant after it had
earlier refused to bind defendant over for trial on the charge of possession of
methamphetamine. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-18a-l(2)(a)
(1999) and 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Was the evidence sufficient to bind defendant over for trial for possession of
methamphetamine where police testified at the preliminary hearing that (1) defendant
admitted to an officer that he had a quarter gram of methamphetamine in his bedroom, and
(2) officers found in defendant's bedroom a small baggy containing a white crystal substance
that field tested positive for methamphetamine (but that the substance was still at the State
Crime Lab pending conclusive testing)?

1

Standard ofReview. The determination of whether to bind a criminal defendant over
for trial is a question of law reviewed for correctness, without deference to the magistrate.
State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 8, 20 P.3d 300; State v. Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah App.
1995); see also State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464,466 (Utah 1991) (holding that a district
court conducts its own review of a bindover order, granting no deference to the magistrate).
This issue was preserved at the preliminary hearing and the State's motion to reconsider,
treated as a rule 24 motion. R. 121; R. 56-61, 104.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are relevant to a
determination of this case:
Utah Const art. LS 12

Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination,
the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution
shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Utah CQ& Aim, § ?3-37-8(2)(a) (gupp. 1999)
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly'and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order,
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
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tltahR Crim.P.70ri

(2) Iffromthe evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed
it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be bound over to
answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on
hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was
acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary
examination.
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate
shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the statefrominstituting a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Based on evidence seizedfromdefendant's vehicle at the Lindon Boat Harbor on the
night of October 18, 2000, defendant was charged by information with possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute within a drug-free zone (Count 1), and possession of drug
paraphernalia within a drug-free zone (Count 3). R. 5-6; R. 121: 7,12-15. The information
also charged defendant with possession of methamphetamine (Count 2). R. 6. That charge
was based on evidence seizedfromdefendant's residence later that night. See R. 121:34-36.
Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for trial on the marijuana and
paraphernalia charges. R. 121: 39-41. However, the magistrate refused to bind defendant
over for trial on the methamphetamine charge because the substance seizedfromdefendant's
home was still at the State Crime Lab pending conclusive testing. R. 121: 39-41.
3

Two and one-half months later, but prior to the entry of any written order dismissing
the methamphetamine charge, the State filed a motion to reconsider the court's refusal to
bind defendant over on the methamphetamine charge. R. 56-61. Treating the motion as a
motion for new trial and relying on its verbal pronouncement at the preliminary hearing that
the methamphetamine charge was dismissed, the court denied the State's motion to
reconsider as untimely. See R. 103-05. The court rejected the State's argument that the
motion was not untimely because a written order of dismissal had not yet been filed, ruling
that such an order was not necessary. See R. 104.
The trial court subsequently granted a defense motion to suppress the evidence seized
from defendant's vehicle when the State's witness failed to appear at the scheduled
suppression hearing. R. 124: 9, Thereafter, the court entered an "Order of Dismissal"
dismissing "the charges as set forth on the Information.'* R. 112- The State timely appealed.
R. 114. The State challenges only the dismissal of the methamphetamine charge.
SUMMARY OF FACTS1

Search of Defendant's Car
While on patrol at approximately 11:00 p.m. on October 18,2000, Sgt. Richard Taylor
noticed two people sitting in a vehicle parked at the end of the pier of the Lindon Boat
Harbor—a public park* R. 121: 7, 19-21. Concerned that the occupants might need
assistance, Sgt. Taylor drove his car closer, paiked, and walked to the car. R. 121:7-8. He

^ e State recites the evidence at the preliminary hearing "in a light most favorable
to the prosecution and resolv[ing] all inferences in favor of the prosecution." State v.
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995).
4

did not activate his overhead emergency lights, nor did he block in the car. See R. 121: 8,
22. Defendant was seated in the driver's seat and a female companion was seated in the front
passenger seat. See R. 121: 8-9. Sgt. Taylor greeted defendant and spoke with him for a
minute. R. 121:9, 23.
As he spoke with defendant, Sgt. Taylor smelled alcohol and burnt marijuana
emanatingfromthe vehicle. R. 121:9,23,29-31. At that point, Sgt. Taylor asked defendant
to produce his driver's license and to exit the car. R. 121:9,23-24. After conducting a patdown search of defendant, Sgt. Taylor searched the car, finding a plastic bag containing
almost 100 grams of compressed, dried marijuana, a set of finger scales, and a box of Zig Zag
rolling papers. R. 121: 9-10, 12, 15, 23-25. After Sgt. Taylor confiscated the marijuana,
defendant admitted that the "weed" belonged to him and that he had just purchased it. R.
121: 16, 26. Sgt. Taylor arrested defendant and advised him of his Miranda rights, which
defendant waived. R. 121: 16.
Search of Defendant's Bedroom
Following defendant's arrest, Sgt. Taylor overheard defendant's female companion
ask him about his bedroom window. R. 121: 17. She then pulled out a cell phone to make
a call, but Sgt. Taylor asked her to give it to him before she was able to do so. R. 121: 17.
Suspecting that illegal drugs may be in defendant's bedroom, Sgt. Taylor sought defendant's
consent to search his bedroom. R. 121:17-18,27-28,35. Defendant asked if they would let
him go if he permitted the search. R. 121: 28. Sgt. Taylor told him they could not do that
under the circumstances. R. 121:28. Nevertheless, defendant agreed to the search. R. 121:

5

17, 27-28. With defendant in the police car, Sgt. Taylor drove to within a block or two of
defendant's home where he was met by three other officers from the sheriffs office. R. 121:
18-19,34. Before directing the three officers to proceed with the search, Sgt. Taylor read to
defendant from the permission to search form, advising him that he had the right to refuse
the search. R. 121:28. After being so advised, defendant signed a written consent to search
his bedroom. R. 121:28.
After defendant signed the written consent, Sgt. Taylor transported him to the jail and
the other officers remained to conduct the search. R. 121:18-19,30,35-36. During his ride
to the jail, defendant told Sgt. Taylor that he was 'Very concerned about them finding
methamphetamine in his bedroom, and he said that all he had was a quarter gram." R. 121?
19. He also asked Sgt. Taylor "if [he] wouldn't charge him for that because it was such a
small amount." R. 121: 19. In the meantime, the officers conducting the search of
defendant's bedroom discovered a small baggy containing a white crystal substance. R. 121:
35-36. Detective Rob Riding collected the evidence and took it to the police station where
officers field tested it for drugs. R. 121: 36,38. The substance, weighing 0.6 grams, tested
positive for methamphetamine. R. 121: 36.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The magistrate refused to bind defendant over for trial because the State did not
introduce the methamphetamine into evidence and had not yet received the final results from
the testing at the State Crime Lab. This was error. Sgt. Taylor testified that defendant
admitted to him that he had a quarter of a gram of methamphetamine in his bedroom.
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Detective Riding, a drug recognition expert, testified that he seized from defendant's
bedroom a baggy containing a white crystal substance that field tested positive for
methamphetamine. This evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable belief that defendant
unlawfully possessed methamphetamine. Where, as here, the evidence at a preliminary
hearing supports a reasonable inference of guilt, the magistrate may not draw other
inferences in favor of innocence. In doing so here, the magistrate impermissibly elevated the
probable cause standard.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS SUFFICIENT
TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE THAT DEFENDANT WAS IN
POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE
A.

THE BINDOVER STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY HEARINGS.

Purpose of the Preliminary Hearing
When a crime is charged by information, the Utah Constitution guarantees the accused
the right to a preliminary hearing. See Utah Const, art. I, § 13; see also State v. Ortega, 751
P.2d 1138,1139(Utah 1988). "[T]he preliminary hearing is used to determine whether there
is sufficient cause to believe a crime has been committed to warrant further proceedings."
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d644,646 (Utah 1986); accord State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159,
f 7, 3 P.3d 725, cert, denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000). Therefore, like a federal grand jury,
the magistrate at a preliminary hearing "staad[s] between the accuser and the accused" to
determine whether the charges are "founded upon reason" or are the result of "hasty,
malicious [or] oppressive persecution." Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375,390,82 S.Ct. 1364,
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1373 (1962); see also State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 784 (Utah 1980) (holding that a
preliminary hearing serves to eliminate "the grave injustice suffered by [a] defendant in an
unwarranted prosecution"). Stated simply, "[t]he preliminary hearing... acts as a screening
device to' ferret out... groundless and improvident prosecutions.'" Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646
(quoting Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783-84) (second ellipsis in original).
Value of Probable Cause Standard
To attain this objective, the Utah Constitution provides that the preliminary
examination be "limited to determining whether probable cause exists." Utah Const, art. I,
§ 12.2 The value of the probable cause standard rests in the "balance [that it strikes] between
the rights of individual citizens and the interests of the people as a whole in law
enforcement." State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220,226 (Utah App. 1995). As observed by the
United States Supreme Court more than one-half century ago:
These long-prevailing standards [of probable cause] seek to safeguard
citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from
unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing
the law in the community's protection. . . . The rule of probable cause is a
practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been
found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more
would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave
law-abiding citizens at the mercy of [law enforcement's] whim or caprice.
Brinegarv. United States, 338 U.S. 160,176,69S.Ct 1302,1311 (1949) (emphases added).
Consistent with this rationale, the preliminary hearing operates "to screen out those [charges]

2

Section 12 indicates that the function of the preliminary hearing is limited to a
probable cause determination "unless otherwise provided by statute." Utah Const, art. I,
§12. The legislature has not enacted any statute expanding the scope of the preliminary
hearing.

8

that are unfounded and to thereby preserve the accused's reputationfrompublic humiliation."
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 527 (Utah 1984).
Evidentiary Burden for Probable Cause
Probable cause is "more than bare suspicion." Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175,69 S.Ct. at
1310. On the other hand, the evidence to establish probable cause "need not be capable of
supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, at f 15,
20 P.3d 300. Indeed, the evidentiary burden for probable cause "is significantly less than that
needed to prove guilt.'" State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231,1235 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis
added). The facts presented at a preliminary hearing do not even have to establish a prima
case of guilt, as in the case of a directed verdict motion. Clark, 2001 UT 9, at fT 11, 16."
Rather, the quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause for a bindover is the
same as that required for an arrest warrant. Id. at f 16. Like the officer seeking an arrest
warrant, "the prosecution [at a preliminary hearing] must present sufficient evidence to
support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant
committed it." Id. As noted by the Supreme Court, "the evidence required [to show probable
cause at this stage of the proceeding]... is relatively low because the assumption is that the
prosecution's case will only get stronger as the investigation continues." Evans v. State, 963
P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1998); accord Clark, 2001 UT 9, at flO.
"The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for
belief of guilt." Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 1310, 69 S.Ct. at 175 (internal quotes and citations
omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, "[i]n establishing probable cause, as the term suggests, we
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deal not in certainties, but in 'probabilities.'" Hartley, 784 P.2dat 1235 (citingBrinegar, 338
U.S. at 175,69 S.Ct. at 1310).3 The Supreme Court in Brinegar explained that "[t]hese are
not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent [people], not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is
accordingly correlative to what must be proved." 338 U.S. at 1310, 69 S.Ct. at 175. Id;
accord State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah App. 1990). Just this month, the Utah
Supreme Court held that probable cause exists where the "' facts and circumstances . . . are
sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the
circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed... an offense.'" State v. Trane, 2002
UT 97, J 26, — Utah Adv. Rep. — (arrest case) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.Sf
31,37,99 S.Ct. 2627,2632 (1979)). In other words, probable cause requires no more than
a "rationally based conclusion of probability." State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah
1986); accord State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 534 (Utah 1994).
As observed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, "probable cause at a preliminary
hearing is satisfied when there exists a believable or plausible account of the defendant's
commission of a felony." State v. Dunn, 121 Wis.2d 389,398,359 N.W.2d 151,155 (Wis.
1984). Therefore, even if an innocent explanation for the defendant's conduct might exist,

3

Because the same quantum of evidence is required for a bindover as that required
for an arrest, which is the same as that required for a search, see Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at
227, decisions addressing the necessary showing for a search are instructive in the context
of a preliminary hearing. The Court in Spurgeon held that a distinction is necessarily
drawn between probable cause to search and probable cause to arrest "because '[e]ach
requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances."' Id.
(1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.1(b), at 544 (2d ed. 1987)).
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"the law does not require that 'all innocent explanations for a person's actions be absent
before those actions can provide probable cause"1 for bindover. State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d
506, 509 (Utah App. 1989) (arrest case) (quoting Wood v. United States, 498 A.2d 1140,
1144 (D.C. 1985)); accord Poole, 871 P.2d at 535 (search case). The probable cause
requirement will be satisfied as long there exists a reasonable inference that supports a
conclusion that the defendant probably committed the crime, even if there are equally strong
inferences to the contrary. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, at f 20 (holding that an inference of
legitimate behavior "does not negate the reasonable inference" of criminal conduct); see also
Dunn, 121 Wis.2d at 395-99, 359 N.W.2d at 154-56. In short, '"unless the evidence is
wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the
[prosecution's] claim,' the magistrate should bind the defendant over for trial." Pledger, 896
P.2d at 1229 (quoting Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983)) (brackets in
original); accord State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, f 10,44 P.3d 730.
Role of the Magistrate
Because the preliminary hearing "is not a trial on the merits, [but] a gateway to the
finder of fact," the magistrate's role is limited. State v. Talbot, 932 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah
1998). Although the magistrate should not countenance "facially incredible evidence,"
Talbot, 972 P.2d at 438, he or she may not otherwise "'sift or weigh the evidence.'" Hester,
2000 UT App 159, at f 7 (quoting State v. tells, 1999 UT 27, f 2,977 P.2d 1192); accord
Clark, 2001 UT 9, at f 10. "Instead, 'the magistrate must view all evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
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prosecution.'" Clark, 2001 UT 9, at f 10 (quoting Hester, 2000 UT App 159, at ^ 7). In
other words, [i]t is not for the [magistrate] at a preliminary hearing to accept the defendant's
version of the facts over the legitimate inferences which can be drawn from the [State's]
evidence." See People v. District Court of Colorado's Seventeenth Judicial District, 803
P.2d 193, 196 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Deciding
between inferences and conflicting evidence is left for the jury. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, at f
10. Accordingly, "[a] magistrate errs when he or she chooses an inference resulting h
release of a defendant when a reasonable alternative inference" supports the State's case. See

Statev.Dunn,U7Ws.2d4$7,49\,345N.W.2d6997l

(Wis. App.), atfd, 121 Wis.2d389,

359 N.W.2d 151 (Wis. 1984). In short, the magistrate's sole duty is uto ensure that aft
'groundless and improvident prosecutions9 are ferreted out" Hester, 2000 UT App 159, f
7,3 P.3d 725 (quoting Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783-84) (emphasis added); accord Clark, 2002
UT 9, at 110.
B.

THE MAGISTIUTE IMPERMISOT^

Applying the legal standards appropriate to a preliminary hearing, the magistrate
should have bound defendant over for trial. To meet the bindover requirement in this case,
the State was required to present evidence sufficient to support a "reasonable belief that
defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed methamphetamine. See Clark, 2001 UT
9, at f 16; Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a){Supp. 1999). The evidence introduced at the
preliminary hearing was more than sufficient.

12

At the preliminary hearing, Sgt. Richard Taylor of the Utah County Sheriffs Office
testified that after arresting defendant at the Lindon Boat Harbor, he overheard defendant's
girlfriend say something to him about his bedroom window. R. 121:17. Sgt. Taylor testified
that based on that conversation, he suspected that "another quantity of controlled substances
or marijuana5' might be in defendant's bedroom. R. 121: 17. Had this been the only
testimony related to the methamphetamine charge, the evidence would not have been
sufficient to support bindover on the methamphetamine charge. See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at
175, 69 S.Ct. at 1310 (holding that bare suspicion not enough to establish probable cause).
It was not the only evidence.
Sgt. Taylor testified that after overhearing the couple's conversation, he asked for and
obtained defendant's consent to search his bedroom in Orem. R. 121: 17, 27-28. With
defendant in his car, Sgt. Taylor drove to within a block or two of defendant's home where
he met three other officers. R. 121:18-19,34. After obtaining defendant's written consent
to search and directing the other officers to conduct the search, Sgt. Taylor drove defendant
to the jail. R. 121: 18-19, 30. Sgt. Taylor testified that on their way to the jail, defendant
told him that "he was concerned—very concerned about themfindingmethamphetamine in
his bedroom" R. 121: 19 (emphasis added). He also said that "all he had was a quarter
gram" and he asked Sgt. Taylor "if [he] wouldn 't charge him for that because it was such
a small amount" R. 121: 19 (emphasis addld). The magistrate, therefore, had before him
defendant's admission that he possessed a quarter gram ofmethamphetamine in his bedroom.
This was sufficient by itself to support a bindover. See Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229-30

13

(binding defendant over on forcible sodomy charges based only on defendant's admission
that he committed two acts of sodomy with the victim, who was an employee, and officer's
testimony that the victim appeared to be 14-years-old).
The State, however, presented additional evidence supporting bindover. During the
search of defendant's bedroom, Detective Rob Riding, a drug recognition expert, seized "a
small baggy that contained a white crystal substance." R. 121: 36. Believing that the white
crystal substance was contraband, he took the baggy to the police station where it was "field
tested" for drugs. See R. 121: 36-38. The substance weighed just over one-half of a gram
and tested positive for methamphetamine. R. 121: 36-38. This evidence, from a drug
recognition expert, constituted a "plausible account" of guilt, Dunn, 121 Wis.2d at 398,359
N.W.2d at 155, and was thus '"sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable
caution, in believing . . . that the [defendant] ha[d] committed . . . a[ ] [drug] offense,'"
Trane, 2002 UT 97, at f 26 (quoting DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37,99 S.Ct. at 2632).
The magistrate, however, refused to bind defendant over because the controlled
substance was still at the State Crime Lab pending more definitive testing. See R. 121: 40.
The magistrate was concerned that the substance might ultimately test negative for
methamphetamine. R. 121:40. When the prosecutor explained that the charge would simply
be dismissed in that event, the magistrate held that "the law [does not] allow[ ] a grab bag"
and granted defendant's motion to dismiss. R. 121:40. In doing so, the magistrate "elevated
the probable-cause standard to unrealistic heights." See Poole, 871 P.2d at 534 (search case).
The magistrate in essence required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As explained, that is

14

not required. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, at f 15. While it remained possible the substance was
something other than methamphetamine, all the evidence suggested otherwise.

By

countenancing the possibility of a different result, the magistrate erroneously chose "an
inference resulting in release of [ ] defendant when a reasonable alternative inference"
supported the State's case. Dunn, 117 Wis.2d at 491,345 N.W.2d at 71. This was error. See
Clark, 2001 UT 9, at f 10 (holding that the magistrate must draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the prosecution).
In sum, it cannot be said that the evidence was "' wholly lacking and incapable of
reasonable inference'" that defendant unlawfully possessed methamphetamine. See Pledger,
896 P.2d at 1229 (quoting Cruz, 660 P.2d at 729).

Defendant admitted to having-

methamphetamine in his bedroom and police found a substance in his bedroom that field
tested positive for methamphetamine. While more may be required to establish defendant's
guilt at trial, i.e., State Crime Lab results, the evidence presented by the State was sufficient
to support a "reasonable belief that defendant committed the offense. See Clark, 2001 UT
9, at f 16. In short, the State's prosecution of the charge was not "groundless and
improvident." Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646 (quoting Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783-84).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the trial
court's order of dismissal and to remand the matter for trial.
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